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QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
A NEW STANDARD
LYNN T. DICKINSON*
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,1 courts have formulated
two categories of workplace sexual harassment.2 The first cate-
gory, hostile environment, makes actionable a work environment
that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."'3 The inquiry is objective: the harassment must be
sufficiently severe and pervasive that a reasonable person would
be offended. 4 The second category, quid pro quo, "something for
something,"5 makes actionable what some have called "sexual
blackmail." That is, an employer or supervisor conditions em-
ployment benefits on the employee's submission to unwelcome
sexual conduct.7
On the surface, the availability of legal recourse for these
categories of harassment appears to prohibit all workplace sexual
harassment. As currently construed by some courts, however,
the quid pro quo cause of action fails to address adequately
situations in which workers are subjected to subtle forms of
sexual coercion or do not suffer traditional tangible harms.8
* J.D. candidate 1996, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 1992, College of
William and Mary. The author would like to thank Professor Susan S. Grover.
1. 42 U.S.C. S 2000(e)-2 (1988). Title VI provides, in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
S 2000(e)-2(aX1).
2. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (affirming the sexual
harassment dichotomy by defining hostile environment sexual harassment as "non quid
pro quo").
3. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
4. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (holding that conduct
reasonably perceived as hostile or abusive is actionable without a showing of psychological
injury).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
7. 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
8. See Marlissa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards
in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718-19 (1989). Marlissa Vinciguerra
argues that courts have improperly limited quid pro quo to "clear cut" cases. Id. at 1718.
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Specifically, quid pro quo is inadequate in two ways: first, it has
been construed too narrowly, often precluding recovery when the
conditioning of the employment benefit upon sex was implied;
and second, it arbitrarily limits recovery to specific economic or
tangible harm, denying a remedy for other legitimate harms.
This Note proposes a standard for quid pro quo cases that
more effectively determines whether a benefit was conditioned
on sex and whether the victim was harmed. Part I provides the
legal background of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Part II
describes the standards courts currently apply to cases in which
the employer merely implied that job benefits were conditioned
on sex,9 and argues that courts should adopt a new standard to
determine whether the employer actually did condition the re-
ceipt of a job benefit on sex.10 Part III discusses the different
types of harm potentially suffered by victims of quid pro quo
sexual harassment, analyzes the strict standards currently used
by courts to determine whether a legally cognizable injury has
been suffered, and argues that the current standards should be
replaced by one that allows recovery for intangible, but never-
theless real, harms. Part IV concludes that one new standard,
combining the standards discussed in Parts II and III, would
most effectively achieve the purposes of Title VII, and therefore
should be adopted by the courts in order to better remedy all
forms of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
I. QUID PRO Quo: THE LEGAL STANDARDS
To determine whether a plaintiff has proven quid pro quo
sexual harassment, most courts use the following five-part test:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) The employee's reaction to [the] harassment complained of
She adds that courts incorrectly use the hostile environment category as a "catch-all"
for sexual harassment, consequently denying plaintiffs recovery under the quid pro quo
cause of action. Id. Specifically, she asserts that courts, by denying recovery under quid
pro quo, have abandoned plaintiffs who resign due to harassment and prove hostile
environment sexual harassment, but cannot prove constructive discharge. Id. at 1736.
Because hostile environment recoveries do not include back pay, this reduces a plaintiff's
pecuniary relief. Id. at 1718- 19.
9. These cases are referred to as "implied conditioning" cases.
10. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1994).
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affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. The acceptance or re-
jection of the harassment by an employee must be an express
or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause
of a tangible job detriment in order to create liability under
this theory of sexual harassment....
(5) Respondeat superior."
Courts have had great difficulty applying the fourth prong of the
quid pro quo test, which attempts to determine whether a benefit
was conditioned on sex and whether the victim was harmed. As
a result, three different tests have evolved, each analyzing the
conduct from a different perspective. Some courts follow the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines,
which state that sexual harassment is unlawful when "submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment ... [or] submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual."'12 Focusing
on the employer's perspective, this test asks whether the em-
ployer committed the illegal act of improperly using sexual con-
duct as a criterion in its decision making. Other courts use a
slightly different test, requiring the employee to show that "her
reaction to these advances affected tangible aspects of ... her
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."'13
This test focuses on the employee's point of view, inquiring
whether the employer's conduct affected the employee in a tan-
gible way. A third test was created by one court that required
the plaintiff to show that "she was deprived of a job benefit
which she was otherwise qualified to receive because of the
employer's use of a prohibited criterion in making the employ-
ment decision."' 4 Considering the perspectives of both the em-
ployer and the employee, this test asks two questions: first,
whether the employee suffered a particular loss; and second,
11. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted);
accord Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990); Spencer v. General
Elec., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 721-22. (5th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co.,
805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
12. 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(1)42) (1995).
13. Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 784 (quoting Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881,
897 (1st Cir. 1988)).
14. Spencer, 894 F.2d at 658.
1995]
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whether the employee's loss was caused by the employer's use
of an improper criterion 5 in its decision making.
Because the three tests adopted by the courts examine conduct
from different perspectives, they produce a wide variety of re-
sults. Courts should adopt a new standard that would provide
greater consistency, prohibit implied conditioning, and remedy
intangible harm.
II. IMPLIED CONDITIONING
A. The Current Legal Standards
In most cases, courts purport to acknowledge that a cause of
action arises when an employer merely implies that the plaintiffs
submission to sexual advances is a condition of receiving tangible
job benefits.'6 Predicting what facts will be defined as an implied
condition in a given case is difficult, however, because some
courts require the implication to be so clear that it is virtually
explicit. 7 A strong implication was required in Spencer v. General
Electric,5 for example, where the Fourth Circuit held that quid
pro quo harassment had not occurred.', In Spencer, the employee
was subjected to repeated sexual advances and was eventually
raped by her supervisor.20 Declining to find a causal nexus be-
cause the supervisor "never mentioned sex in connection with a
promotion,' 2' the court enunciated an onerous burden of proof to
15. An example of an improper criterion is the employee's rejection of the harassment.
16. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 784; Spencer, 894 F.2d at 658; Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,
722 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Manage-
ment Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909
(11th Cir. 1982).
17. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 784 (recognizing that the conditioning of job
benefits can be express or implied but holding that there had been quid pro quo
harassment on other grounds: the plaintiffs reaction to the harassment, her refusal to
acquiesce in her supervisor's conduct, affected tangible aspects of her employment because
she was fired); Spencer, 894 F.2d at 659 (holding that the plaintiff submitted sufficient
evidence to create an inference that the benefit was implicitly conditioned on sex, but
subsequently finding that the defendant rebutted that inference); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414
(holding that neither explicit nor implicit conditioning occurred); Jones, 793 F.2d at 722
(holding that the plaintiff "fafl[ed] to establish that [she] was required to accept sexual
harassment as a condition to the receipt of a job benefit").
18. 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990).
19. Id. at 659.
20. Id. at 654.
21. Id. at 659.
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show implied conditioning.2 As a result, the burden of proof used
in the Fourth Circuit requires a showing of verbal requests for
sex "in connection with" a particular job benefit.2
The fourth prong of quid pro quo was applied differently by
the Sixth Circuit in Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management
Co. , 4 where the court created another standard for proving
implied conditioning.25 In Highlander, the plaintiff invited her
supervisor out for a drink to discuss her promotion possibilities.
26
Declining the invitation, the supervisor placed his arm around
the plaintiff and said that "if she was interested in becoming a
co-manager, 'there is a motel across the street.""' In spite of this
verbal statement implying that an encounter at the motel was a
condition of obtaining a promotion, the court held that there was
no quid pro quo sexual harassment, in part because "[the plaintiff]
placed no serious implications upon [her supervisor's] conduct."' 8
The plaintiff had told an area manager that she did not want to
"mak[e] an issue of the incident because she did not 'think it was
that big of a deal."'9 When she was fired one month after
reporting the harassment to the company president, however,
the plaintiff decided to sue3 In holding that there was no express
or implied conditioning of job benefits, the court inserted a new
factor into the test: whether the plaintiff thought the conditioning
had "serious implications." 31 The addition of this "serious impli-
cations" element is inappropriate because even if the plaintiff
thought the implied conditioning did not have serious implica-
tions 3 2 the plaintiff should have a cause of action if the unlawful
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986).
25. See id. at 649.
26. Id. at 646.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 649.
29. Id. at 646.
30. Id. at 647.
31. See id. at 649. Under this analysis, the "serious implications" factor would probably
negate even explicit conditioning. If there was evidence that after the supervisor explicitly
offered to exchange sex for a job benefit, the plaintiff said she did not think her
supervisor's offer had serious implications, for example, the supervisor would not be
liable. By focusing on the plaintiffs evaluation of the event, the court would permit a
supervisor to commit the unlawful act of conditioning a job benefit on sex.
32. Many reasons exist, all of which should be considered irrelevant when deciding
whether the harassment occurred, to explain why the plaintiff may have stated that she
thought her supervisor's conduct did not have serious implications. SeeKathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1995J
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implied conditioning nevertheless occurred. Regardless of how
serious she thought the treatment was, a person who is subjected
to treatment that Congress and the EEOC have declared unlawful
is entitled to state a claim. 33 Surely Congress and the EEOC
thought the act of conditioning employment benefits was serious
when they chose to make it unlawful. 4 In the Sixth Circuit,
therefore, it is not enough for a supervisor to request sex verbally
in connection with a job benefit, as is required by the Fourth
Circuit:35 the plaintiff must also realize that her supervisor's
conduct has serious implications. 36
In stark contrast to the heightened burdens imposed by Spencer
and Highlander, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, in Wilson v. Wayne County,37 construed
the fourth prong of quid pro quo to require a much lower burden
of proof.s In Wilson, the plaintiff had planned to cease working
for the defendant and to return to college but later decided to
continue working 9 Shortly after a conversation during which the
plaintiff asked her employer for extended employment, the de-
fendant called the plaintiff into his office and raped her.40 Noting
that "[m]inutes after she raised the issue again, the [defendant]
called her into his office for sex,"'41 the court found that the
defendant "had made submission to his sexual advances the test
for whether [the plaintiff] would stay on as [an employee]."4 2 In"
1183, 1201 (1989} (explaining that the plaintiffs "statements that she did not want to
raise 'a big stink' may have expressed the discomfort that she felt as a new employee
about complaining to management, or the anxiety produced by the entire incident"). If
the plaintiff was too ashamed to reveal her true feelings, for example, her internalization
of the abuse could be evidence that it was more, not less, serious.
33. Whereas the plaintiffs reaction to the conduct is irrelevant when determining
whether the defendant is liable, the fact that the plaintiff "did not 'think it was that big
of a deal,"' Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1986),
could be considered by the court when determining the amount of damages to award.
Accord Lehmann v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 457 (N.J. 1993) (explaining that if
the plaintiff seeks recovery for psychological harm, "that proof goes to the amount of
her damages, not to whether she states a cause of action").
34. See 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980) (amended at 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980), and codified
at 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11) (proposed Apr. 11, 1980) ("[Slexual harassment ... generates a
harmful atmosphere.").
35. See Spencer v. General Elec., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990).
36. See Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649.
37. 856 F. Supp. 1254 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
38. See id. at 1260.
39. Id. at 1257.
40. Id. at 1257-58.
41. Id. at 1260.
42. Id.
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this case, there was neither a verbal statement implying that
the plaintiffs continued employment was conditioned upon her
performing sexual favors, 3 as required by the Fourth Circuit,"
nor any evidence specifically proving that the plaintiff placed
serious implications on the conduct,4 as required by the Sixth
Circuit.46 The implication was based purely on evidence of a
temporal link.47 In the Middle District of Tennessee, therefore, a
mere temporal link between a conversation about a job benefit
and an unwelcome sexual act permits a holding that implied
conditioning occurred.4 8
These three cases exemplify the wide variety of outcomes that
result under the fourth prong of the quid pro quo test. This
unpredictable, and often unjust, test should be replaced by a
standard that provides a more effective remedy and greater
predictability.
B. A New Standard: The Reasonable Person
The purposes'of the quid pro quo cause of action are to prevent
a supervisor from using employment-related authority to obtain
sexual favors from a subordinate employee 49 and to prohibit the
use of the employee's reaction to such conduct as the basis for
employment decisions affecting that employee.60 Because super-
visors can abuse their power explicitly or implicitly, blatantly or
subtly, courts must permit recovery even when no express agree-
ment to trade sexual favors for job benefits was made. 51 Although
most courts do recognize a cause of action for implied condition-
ing,52 the heavy burdens of proof imposed severely narrow the
43. See id.
44. See Spencer v. General Elec., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990).
45. See Wilson, 856 F. Supp. at 1260.
46. See Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 1986).
Presumably every plaintiff would place serious implications on being raped. However,
many victims react by denying the seriousness of the abuse. See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile
Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43
EMORY L.J. 151, 230 (1994) ("Women tend to react with disbelief, minimizing and denying
that they are experiencing discrimination, and therefore fail to take action.").
47. See Wilson, 856 F. Supp. at 1260.
48. See id.
49. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that
the wrong in quid pro quo cases is the supervisor's use of his authority to extort sex
from the employee).
50. 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(2) (1995).
51. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. at 1260.
52. gee, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990); Spencer
19951
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scope of Title VII protection, undermining its effectiveness.0
Courts can reinvigorate the quid pro quo cause of action by
adopting a clear objective standard.
Such an objective standard was adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Nichols v. Frank.64 Recognizing the need for a better standard,
Judge Reinhardt explained that it is precisely because it is
difficult to identify implied conditioning that it is "far more likely
to take place than ... the explicit variety. s55 According to the
court, because harassers have learned that they can no longer
overtly harass their victims withput facing legal repercussions,
they now use subtle techniques. 6 Whether the accused harasses
his victim implicitly or 'explicitly, however, the result for the
victim is the sameV She is still forced to choose "between
acceding to sexual demands and forfeiting job benefits ... or
otherwise suffering tangible job detriments."' ' Because one pur-
pose of the quid pro quo cause of action is to prevent employees
from being confronted with these untenable options, 59 a cause of
action arises when the employee reasonably feels she is faced
with this choice. 60
Finding the five-part test "unnecessarily complicated and overly
formalistic,"61 Judge Reinhardt articulated a new standard that
fully embodies the purposes of the quid pro quo cause of action.6 2
Judge Reinhardt stated that in deciding whether an individual
conditioned a job benefit on an employee's acceptance of sexual
conduct,
we may reach our conclusion by either of two means. We can
apply an objective standard, under which we determine whether
a reasonable person in the accuser's position would have be-
lieved that he or she was the subject of quid pro quo sexual
v. General Elec., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644,
648 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
53. See supra part II.A.
54. 42 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 512.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
59. See id. (stating that quid pro quo is "anchored in" an employer forcing the employee
to choose between sex and employment benefits).
60. Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511-12.
61. Id. at 511.
62. See id. at 511-12.
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harassment.... In the alternative, we can apply a subjective
standard, under which the fact finder may inquire into whether
the alleged harasser actually intended to subject the accuser
to quid pro quo sexual harassment 3
In articulating this new standard, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the difficulties courts face in implied conditioning cases. 4 The
court emphasized that judges must use the utmost care in ex-
amining these cases because implied conditioning is often difficult
to identify.6 5 In the absence of an express statement conditioning
benefits on sex, courts must analyze the facts and circumstances
of each particular case to decide whether a condition was nev-
ertheless implied.66 The court suggested that one way to establish
a violation is by examining the "verbal nexus."8 7 The verbal
nexus recognizes that implied conditioning becomes more likely
as the amount of time between a conversation about benefits and
a request for sex decreases.6 The court emphasized, however,
that examining the verbal nexus is only one possible method that
may not apply in all circumstances. 6 9 The court stated, "no rule
or set of rules will provide an answer in all circumstances....
[T]here is no substitute for a rigorous examination in each in-
stance of all of the relevant facts and circumstances." 70
The objective test created by the Ninth Circuit best serves
the purposes of Title VII because it is satisfied at the precise
moment when the harm of the harassment is inflicted: when the
reasonable employee would perceive that her benefit is condi-
tioned upon sex. When the reasonable employee reaches that
conclusion, she must choose between having sex and forfeiting a
job benefit,71 the very dilemma Title VII seeks to prevent.72
Because this reasonable employee test excludes the various fac-
tors courts have inappropriately included in the inquiry,73 and
63. Id.
64. See id. at 512.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 512-13.
68. See id. at 513.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of the harm a woman suffers from facing that choice, see infra
part MI.B.1.
72. See Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
73. Not only do courts insert the factors illustrated in the above cases, courts also
insert the issue of tangible or economic harm. Many courts determine liability, not
damages, based on the plaintiff's reaction to the conditioning. The appropriate inquiry,
however, is whether the illegal conditioning actually occurred. The plaintiff's reaction
should only be relevant when determining the amount of her damages. See infra part III.
1995]
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asks only the relevant question, it will produce more accurate
and predictable results. In addition, this test provides better
guidance to courts without favoring either party. Whereas its
focus on the employee's perspective will provide better guidance
to courts by channeling their analysis, its objectivity also will
protect employers from a hypersensitive employee.7 4 Finally, this
test appropriately allows recovery when a victim, who may be
having difficulty confronting her predicament, denies the severity
of her harm. Courts should adopt this standard because it most
effectively serves the purposes of Title VII.
III. TANGIBLE HARM
A. The Current Legal Standards
When determining whether there has been quid pro quo sexual
harassment, courts focus heavily on actual tangible or economic
harm.75 Because quid pro quo is based on an exchange of an
employment benefit for sex, many courts infer that no cause of
action can lie unless the employee actually forfeited an employ-
ment benefit or suffered another tangible loss. 76 In the area of
hostile environment sexual harassment, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that tangible harm is not required.77 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue
in the quid pro quo context, however, the question has produced
74. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (using an objective
standard in a hostile environment sexual harassment case); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (using the objective reasonable woman standard to protect
the employer from a hypersensitive employee).
75. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that no
quid pro quo occurred in part because the plaintiff failed to prove that the harassment
resulted in a tangible job detriment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Highlander, 805
F.2d at 649 (holding that no quid pro quo occurred in part because there was no evidence
that the plaintiff suffered a job detriment); Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health
Science Ctr., 826 F. Supp. 625, 629 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that no quid pro quo occurred
because negative work evaluations did not directly alter the plaintiff's economic status),
appeal dismissed, 23 F.3d 396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994); Ridge v. HCA"
Health Serv., Inc., 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43.071, at 79,979.80 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding
that quid pro qub did occur because the plaintiff's work schedule constituted a concrete
job benefit).
76. See, e.g., Jones, 793 F.2d at 722; Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649; Anderson, 826 F.
Supp. at 629; Ridge, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 79.979-80.
77. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
1
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confusion among courts.78 As a result, courts have developed a
variety of approaches in deciding whether a plaintiff suffered a
legally cognizable harm.
The Fifth Circuit set forth one approach in Jones v. Flagship
International.9 In Jones, the plaintiff had been subjected to
several sexual advances by her supervisor.8 ° The court held that
to prove quid pro quo "the employee must prove that she was
deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to
receive."81 In finding no quid pro quo harassment, the court
explained that the "[plaintiff] failed to demonstrate that the
incidents ... resulted in a tangible job detriment. " 82 The high
standard espoused by the Fifth Circuit, therefore, precludes a
plaintiff from claiming quid pro quo unless she can show she
actually suffered a tangible job detriment.8
One United States District Court adopted a more narrow
interpretation by completely barring recovery because the plain-
tiffs "economic status was not altered."84 The court stated:
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that the advances oc-
curred and that plaintiff received negative evaluations because
of his rejection thereof, the evidence shows that his economic
status was not altered as a result. Plaintiff was not demoted,
passed over for promotion, suspended, laid-off, or discharged
as a direct result of [his supervisor's] evaluations.85
Here, the Northern District of New York set forth a list of
possible "economic" harms, explicitly excluding negative job eval-
uations.86 Under this standard, therefore, it is permissible for the
employer to consider the employee's refusal to grant sexual
favors when evaluating that employee's job performance.8 Be-
78. Because the holding in Meritor was not expressly limited to hostile environment
cases, courts could extend its decision not to require tangible harm to quid pro quo as
well. Despite this possibility, most courts continue to require a tangible or economic harm
without addressing Meritor. See, e.g., Anderson, 826 F. Supp. at 629; Ridge, 64 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 79,979-80.
79. 793 F.2d at 721-22.
80. Id. at 716-17.
81. Id. at 722.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr., 826 F. Supp. 625, 629
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cause a job performance evaluation is equivalent to an employ-
ment decision, 8s however, this standard directly conflicts with the
EEOC Guidelines, which provide that basing employment deci-
sions on submission to unwelcome sexual conduct is unlawful.8 9
Furthermore, employment evaluations can give the employer
legitimate reasons to pass over for promotion, demote, or dis-
charge the employee,90 decisions that do make the court's list of
actionable harms.91 According to the Northern District of New
York, therefore, tangible harm is not only required, but it must
be in the form of direct harm to the employee's economic status.92
The court's narrow interpretation of harm is entirely inconsistent
with Title VII's goal "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women,'"93 because it severely limits that
"spectrum."
Another court espoused a broader interpretation of job benefits
and held that a plaintiff's work schedule was a tangible job
benefit.9 4 The court noted that the "[p]laintiffs major job benefit
was that she could work at the job and have her schedule coincide
with her ability to attend local university classes."9 5 Recognizing
that this convenience was a concrete benefit and that it was
conditioned upon sex, the court held that the plaintiff had alleged
a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment.9 6 This more
lenient definition of job benefits, which includes factors that are
88. Title VII prohibits discrimination "with respect to [an employee's] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," 42 U.S.C. S 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1988), and the
EEOC Guidelines refer to these as "employment decisions." 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(2) (1995).
Job performance evaluations must be treated as "employment decisions" because evalu-
ations are used to make Title VII "employment decisions." See Shrout v. Black Clawson
Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 780 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that the plaintiff proved a cause of
action in quid pro quo sexual harassment when she proved that her refusal to submit to
her supervisor's demands resulted in his withholding performance evaluations and salary
reviews, which caused plaintiff to receive no pay increases). Allowing employers to base
their evaluations on sex would completely eviscerate the statute.
89. 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(aX2) (1995).
90. The court itself admits that job evaluations form the basis of employment decisions
by holding that the plaintiff was discharged due to the negative evaluations submitted
by his other supervisors. Anderson, 826 F. Supp. at 629.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64'(1986) (emphasis added) (quoting
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971)).
94. Ridge v. HCA Health Serv., Inc., 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,071, at 79,979-.
80 (D. Kan. 1992).
95. Id. at 79,980.
96. Id.
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not directly "economic" but nevertheless are "terms" of employ-
ment, is more aligned with the purposes of Title VII.9
The variety of definitions of the harm required to prove quid
pro quo sexual harassment reveals that courts need better guid-
ance on this issue. Likewise, plaintiffs deserve more predictabil-
ity. Most importantly, women are entitled to a remedy that
effectively protects them from the entire realm of sexual harass-
ment.
B. A New Standard
Because the purpose of Title VII is to ensure that women and
men have equal employment opportunities,98 courts should inter-
pret the statute to prohibit any acts or practices that disparately
impede the ability of one group to succeed.9 9 The harm targeted
should be the creation of an uneven playing field for men and
women, in whatever form it appears. 100 Limiting recovery to
tangible or economic harm is inconsistent with the goal of elim-
inating inequality1 because opportunities can be rendered une-
qual in a multitude of intangible and noneconomic ways.10 2 Courts
97. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (stating that the purpose of Title VII is to prevent all
forms of unequal treatment).
98. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress
in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of ... employees over other employees.").
99. See id at 431 ("What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.").
100. One author has explained that all forms of gender differences, cultural and
biological, should be considered when seeking to create symmetry. Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1296 (1987). She stated:
[Tihe function of equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual,
costless relative to each other, so that anyone may follow a male, female, or
androgynous lifestyle according to their natural inclination or choice without
being punished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded for following a
male one.
Id. at 1297.
101. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (noting congressional intent to focus on the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment); accord Lehmann v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445,
457 (N.J. 1993) ("Because discrimination itself is the harm that the LAD [Law Against
Discrimination] seeks to eradicate, additional harms need not be shown.
102. One writer has argued that women who are harassed at work suffer economic
effects even when their employers do not directly take action against them. See L. Camille
Hebert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for Women, KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 41, 44. L. Camille Hebert attributes this loss to the employee's
diminished job performance that results from the stress caused by the harassment. Id.
at 46.
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should recognize a quid pro quo cause of action in two situations
that do not involve tangible or economic harm: first, when a
supervisor attempts to force an employee to choose between a
job detriment and sex, but the employee refuses and neither
provides sex nor suffers any job detriment; and second, when an
employee submits to the demand for sex and thereby avoids any
job detriment.10 3
1. Refusal: Facing a Hobson's Choice Is a Legitimate Harm
Judge Bowen, of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, recognized a quid pro quo cause of
action in Mills v. Amoco Performance Products°4 even though the
employee did not suffer a tangible job detriment.105 In Mills, the
plaintiff based her quid pro quo claim on her supervisor's state-
ment that "women could sometimes get out of having to do [the
undesirable job duty] if they had sex with their supervisor.' 0 6
Although the plaintiff refused the defendant's request for sex,' °7
she was never forced to do the unwanted job duty.10 8 Thus, the
defendant argued that because the plaintiff neither submitted to
his sexual demands nor performed the unwanted job duty, no
quid pro quo occurred.109 Nevertheless, the court recognized that
harm occurred when the defendant committed the illegal act of
conditioning. 10 Reasoning that incurring a tangible detriment"'
is not a critical element of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the
court emphasized that it is the act of conditioning the job benefit
which is the "quintessence of quid pro quo sexual harassment.""2
The plaintiff had properly alleged a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment by asserting that such conditioning occurred."3
103. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778-80 (2d Cir.) (noting the difference
between "refusal" cases and "submission" cases, and holding that a quid pro quo claim
can be made out in both), cert. deitied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
104. 872 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
105. Id. at 989.
106. Id. at 981 n.4.
107. Id. at 981.
108. Id. at 989.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The plaintiff had not incurred a tangible detriment because she was neither forced
to do the undesirable job duty nor forced to have sex with her supervisor. Id. However,
having to confront this Hobson's choice is an intangible harm. See infra note 116 and
accompanying text.
112. Mills, 872 F. Supp. at 989.
113. Id.
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Allowing a quid pro quo claim to prevail when the harm
suffered was not tangible is appropriate because it remedies the
wrongful act, the act of conditioning. Because it is the misappro-
priation of authority which is prohibited under quid pro quo,"4 a
cause of action should lie whenever conditioning occurs, regard-
less of whether the employee's harm was tangible. 15 Requiring
tangible harm ignores the fact that the employee was harmed
by being forced to choose between a job detriment and sex. 16
Conditioning causes an intangible harm by "sexualizing" the
employee and consequently preventing her from feeling equal to
her male coworkers who are not forced to make this choice. 17
Limiting recovery to tangible or economic harm ignores the
intangible and noneconomic harms that sexual harassment causes,
legitimate harms that Title VII was also intended to prevent." 8
Courts should follow the reasoning applied in Mills and allow
recovery for the intangible harms caused by the imposition of
the unfair choice between a job detriment and sex.
2. Submission:"9 Having Unwanted Sex Is a Legitimate Harm
Judge McLaughlin, of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, allowed a quid pro quo claim to prevail in
Karibian v. Columbia University'20 when the plaintiff submitted
to her supervisor's demands for sex in order to avoid suffering
a tangible job detriment. 2' In Karibian, the plaintiffs supervisor
114. See id.; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that in quid pro quo the supervisor uses his authority to "extort" sexual
consideration from the employee).
115. See Mills, 872 F. Supp. at 989 (focusing on the act of conditioning rather than the
nature of the harm it caused).
116. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the injury caused by sexual harassment
should be defined as "being placed in the-position of having to choose between unwanted
sex and employment benefits or favorable conditions." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 37 (1979).
117. Abrams, supra note 32, at 1209. Kathryn Abrams has argued that sexual remarks
"remindo a woman that she is viewed as an object of sexual derision rather than as a
credible coworker." Id. at 1208.
118. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
119. Catharine MacKinnon described the need for a remedy in these "submission" cases
when she argued that sexual harassment recovery should not be limited to women who
successfully refuse the harassment because "women who are forced to submit to sex
must be understood as harmed not less, but as much or more, than those who are able
to make their refusals effective." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 110
(1987).
120. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
121. Id. at 778-79.
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"coerced her into a violent sexual relationship by telling her that
she 'owed him' for all he was doing for her as her supervisor."12
In overruling the trial court's assertion that quid pro quo requires
proof of "actual-rather than threatened-economic loss,"1 the
appeals court noted that "[t]here is nothing in the language of
Title VII or the EEOC Guidelines to support such a require-
ment.1 24
The court explained that in refusal cases, those in which the
plaintiff rebuffs her employer's demands for sex, evidence of a
job detriment is usually readily accessible. 125 When the plaintiff
submits to her employer's unlawful requests, on the other hand,
such evidence is usually not available.126 Noting that the absence
of such evidence renders the supervisor's conduct no less wrong-
ful,1' 7 the court held that evidence of a tangible job detriment is
not always essential to a quid pro quo claim.12 The court stated:
Under the district court's rationale, only the employee who
successfully resisted the threat of sexual blackmail could state
a quid pro quo claim. We do not read Title VII to punish the
victims of sexual harassment who surrender to unwelcome
sexual encounters....
... [O1nce an employer conditions any terms of employment
upon the employee's submitting to unwelcome sexual advances,
a quid pro quo claim is made out, regardless of whether the
employee (a) rejects the advances and suffers the consequences,
or (b) submits to the advances in order to avoid those conse-
quences. 129
In ruling on quid pro quo cases, courts should follow the Second
Circuit's approach and focus on whether the prohibited conduct
122. Id. at 776.
123. Id. (quoting Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 812 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
rev'd, 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994)).
124. Id. at 778. In making this assertion, the court cited Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986), and quoted the Supreme Court's assertion that "the
language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination." Karibian,
14 F.3d at 778 (quoting Meitor, 477 U.S. at 64). This quotation, which actually refers to
hostile environment cases, see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, is here being applied, by analogy,
to quid pro quo cases. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.




129. Id. at 778-79.
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occurred, without regard to the plaintiffs reaction. 130 The victim's
response to the unlawful conditioning after it has occurred, i.e.,
whether she refused or submitted, has no bearing on the defen-
dant's liability;131 the defendant's liability depends on whether he
conditioned benefits on sex.13 2
Furthermore, the harm caused by submission to unwanted sex
must be remedied. Being forced to engage in unwanted sexual
intercourse or other unwanted sexual conduct is a serious viola-
tion of an individual's physical autonomy. When an employee
submits to unwanted sexual intercourse, it is rape.133 Rather than
using physical force, however, a supervisor in the employment
context uses economic force. Because the violation of an indivi-
dual's body is arguably a more fundamental harm than any
economic or tangible loss, courts should follow the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning and provide a remedy. Finally, the United States
Supreme Court has already held that no tangible job detriment
is required in hostile environment cases.' 34 Extending that holding
to the quid pro quo arena would provide consistency in this
increasingly complex area of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tests put forth in Nichols v. Frank,3 5 Mills v. Amoco
Performance Products,'36 and Karibian v. Columbia University,137
when combined, provide a useful and effective standard for courts
to apply in quid pro quo sexual harassment cases. The new
analysis asks whether a reasonable person'a in the victim's
130. See id. at 779. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that "[w]hether or not the woman
complies, the crucial issue is whether she was sexually coerced by economic threats or
promises.... Her compliance does not mean it is not still blackmail." MACKiNNON, supra
note 116, at 37.
131. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
132. Id.
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (6th ed. 1990) defines rape as "[t]he act of sexual
intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife and without her consent,
committed when the woman's resistance is overcome by force or fear, or under other
prohibitive conditions."
134. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
135. 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
136. 872 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
137. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
138. Some courts incorporate the victim's gender into this objective standard, creating
a "reasonable woman standard." E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that when examining the severity of hostile environment sexual harassment,
courts should consider the victim's gender to avoid permitting conduct males find
unoffensive but women find objectionable). This standard could be used in this new quid
pro quo standard as well. See Nichols, 42 F.3d at 512.
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situation would infer that job benefits were conditioned on sex.139
This first step is the only part of the analysis that examines the
victim's perspective. 4 ' If the reasonable person would make this
inference, the conditioning did occur and the defendant is liable,'
regardless of how the plaintiff responded to the conduct. 4 2 Issues
such as whether she incurred tangible or intangible loss,'4 and
whether she refused or submitted to the harassment are irrele-
vant;144 the employer is liable for the supervisor's unlawful abuse
of authority. 4 '
The United States Supreme Court should grant certiorari in
a quid pro quo case to clarify the law in this area. Plaintiffs need
to know when they have been wronged, and employers need to
know at what point they become liable. Most importantly, the
purposes of quid pro quo must be reflected in the analysis used
by the courts. By granting certiorari and adopting a standard
that incorporates the holdings of Nichols'14 Mills,147 and Kcri-
bian,48 the Court could bring much needed predictability to the
law of sexual harassment and revitalize the true purposes of the
quid pro quo cause of action.
139. See Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511.13.
140. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779 (noting that "'tlhe
conduct, not the victim's reaction").
141. See NichIs, 42 F.3d at 511-13.
142. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778-79.
143. See Mills v. Amoco Performance Prods., 872 F.
144. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778-79.
145. See Mills, 872 F. Supp. at 989.
146. 42 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1994).
147. 872 F. Supp. at 975.
148. 14 F.3d at 773.
focus should be on the prohibited
Supp. 975, 989 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
